Employment Cyclicality and Firm Quality * Who fares worse in an economic downturn, low-or high-paying firms? Different answers to this question imply very different consequences for the costs of recessions. Using U.S. employer-employee data, we find that employment growth at low-paying firms is less cyclically sensitive. High-paying firms grow more quickly in booms and shrink more quickly in busts. We show that while during recessions separations fall in both high-paying and lowpaying firms, the decline is stronger among low-paying firms. This is particularly true for separations that are likely voluntary. Our findings thus suggest that downturns hinder upward progression of workers toward higher paying firms -the job ladder partially collapses. Workers at the lowest paying firms are 20% less likely to advance in firm quality (as measured by average pay in a firm) in a bust compared to a boom. Furthermore, workers that join firms in busts compared to booms will on average advance only half as far up the job ladder within the first year, due to both an increased likelihood of matching to a lower paying firm and a reduced probability of moving up once matched. Thus our findings can account for some of the lasting negative impacts on workers forced to search for a job in a downturn, such as displaced workers and recent college graduates.
Introduction
Worker sorting across rms has long been thought to play a central role in labor market eciency. Despite frictions that can inhibit this sorting process, such as search costs or imperfect learning, workers are thought to gradually move towards jobs of better overall-or match-specic quality.
1 At the same time, recessions may impede worker sorting. Several papers have noted that worker churn and job-to-job mobility declined during recent recessions and that this decline was particularly severe during the Great Recession.
2 This suggests that a worker's ability to move on from poor job matches or bad jobs is curtailed in times of high unemployment. A natural question, then, is in what types of jobs are workers at least temporarily saddled? If the business cycle has dierential impacts on jobs or rms of varying quality, the consequences of reduced mobility could be very dierent. In this paper, we ask who fares worse in an economic downturn, low-or high-paying rms?
The classic Schumpeter (1939) cleansing eect posits that in recessions resources are reallocated to more productive rms, since, after a negative productivity shock, the least productive endeavors are no longer worthwhile.
3 Because productivity and pay are typically positively correlated (see for example Seranelli 2012) , cleansing predicts that in recessions workers ow to high-paying rms. However, there are also reasons to expect employment to contract by relatively more among high-paying rms during recessions. For example, the notion of a job ladder suggests that workers tend to ow from bad jobs to good, i.e., from low-to high-paying jobs (Burdett and Mortensen 1998) . If during recessions higher paying rms choose not to expand, then lower paying rms might nd it easier to hold on to productive employees and might thus shrink by relatively less than high-paying rms.
4 It is also possible that high-paying rms produce goods for whom demand is more sensitive to the business cycle, maybe because they tend to produce goods that are more highly priced.
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Empirically, it is therefore an open question whether the job ladder eect or dierential product market cyclicality will outweigh any Schumpeterian cleansing. If so, then during recessions, employment in low-paying rms would decline less rapidly than that in high 1 This idea goes at least as far back as the canonical work of Jovanovic (1979) ; for empirical work on job mobility see Farber's 1999 survey. 2 See in particular Lazear and Spletzer (2012), Hyatt and McEntarfer (2012a) . 3 Many theoretical papers seek to explain this phenomenon by exploiting a friction that inhibits resources from being allocated optimally. Recessions can produce large enough shocks to overcome any frictions inhibiting optimal reallocation. See for example Hall (1991) , Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , Hammour (1994, 1996) and Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo (2001) . 4 Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013) write down a dynamic Burdett and Mortensen-style search model with a job ladder with exactly this implication, that in a downturn rms at the bottom of the job ladder fare relatively better since their workers are less likely to be poached away by rms at higher rungs. 5 For example, Bils and Klenow (1998) show that consumer demand for luxury goods is more cyclically sensitive than for other products such as non-durables. The cyclical upgrading literature (Okun 1973, Bils and McLaughlin 2001) shows that jobs in high-paying industries (such as durable goods manufacturing) are more sensitive to the business cycle than jobs in low-paying industries (such as non-durable goods manufacturing), likely because products in these industries have more cyclically sensitive demand. This implies that opportunities to move into these jobs become relatively less prevalent in contractions.
paying rms.
In this paper we investigate the employment eects of the business cycle across highand low-paying rms. We use data from the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) program, a U.S. employer-employee matched database, from 1998 to 2011. We rst show that employment growth at low-paying rms is less sensitive to the business cycle, as measured by the state unemployment rate, than that at higher paying rms. This is important because it implies that the quality of jobs erodes in a downturn. We next provide evidence that the growth rate eect is likely driven by a partial collapse of movement up the job ladder in a bust, as opposed to dierences in product market cyclicality and other possible factors. This implies that low-paying rms fare relatively better in a downturn because workers who would like to move on to better opportunities get stuck there. We estimate that movement up the job ladder is 20% slower for those working at the lowestpaying rms in a large bust, compared to a boom. We also estimate that the distribution of new job matches shifts towards these lower-paying rms in a downturn. The combination of a worse initial match and a reduced likelihood of upgrading implies that new job matchers are particularly scarred by recessions. We estimate that rm quality a year after matching, as measured by average rm pay, is 2.6% lower for those matching in a large recession compared to a boom. Thus the dynamics presented in this paper have important implications for the literature on the long-lasting eects of recessions on workers, which tends to nd that those forced to search for jobs in a downturn, e.g., recent college graduates and displaced workers, are particularly damaged.
The growth rate result is surprising, since it is inconsistent with Schumpeterian cleansing.
However it does line up with a small, recent body of work examining employment growth rates over the business cycle as a function of rm size. Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) show in a number of countries including the U.S. that dierential growth rates of small-, compared to large-, rms are positively related to the unemployment rate. Fort, Haltiwanger, Jarmin
and Miranda (2013) analyze rm growth over the business cycle as a function of rm age and size, using U.S. data. They nd that small, young, rms typically fare relatively better in cyclical contractions, although this relationship reversed in the 2007-09 recession. This recent literature thus supports the notion that low-quality rms (small or low-paying) are somewhat sheltered by the business cycle, but has so far been unable to empirically pinpoint the underlying mechanisms. 6 We devote the bulk of this paper to disentangling mechanisms and quantifying the impacts on workers.
Net growth in a given quarter equals hires minus separations in that quarter. It is well known that both hiring and separations decline during periods of high unemployment, and 6 The recent work on rm size is at odds with an older literature, interested in establishing whether small rms face credit constraints and whether these are exacerbated in recessions. The literature had been inconclusive on this question but tended to nd empirical support for a greater sensitivity to credit constraints among small rms. See for example Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) , Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (2007), and Sharpe (2004) .
we show that this holds across all rms. However, we nd that separations decline by more in lower paying rms than higher paying rms. This relatively larger decline in separations among low-paying rms accounts for the relatively higher growth rates in employment among low-, compared to high-, paying rms in economic downturns. In addition, we nd that the relative dierence in separations between low-and high-paying rm is driven by job-to-job transitions rather than by separations that are followed by at least a full quarter of nonemployment. We believe that separations directly to another employer are more likely to represent voluntary moves. Thus, we interpret our result as evidence that low-paying rms grow relative to high-paying rms in recessions predominantly because they experience a greater decline in voluntary quits.
7 It is then likely that a reduction in moves up the job ladder during downturns drives our result.
We do nd, in addition, that dierential impacts on moves to non-employment play a small role: higher-paying rms experience small increases in separations to non-employment in downturns, while low-paying rms do not. A separation to at least a full quarter of non-employment is unlikely to be a voluntary move on the part of a worker and more likely signies a layo. Therefore high-paying rms shrink in downturns predominantly because they do not experience as large a decline in voluntary exits (as mentioned above) but also because they have a small increase in layos. High-paying rms could face a greater need to lay o workers because demand for their products is more cyclically sensitive or because they had an easier time hiring workers during the preceding boom (being at the top of the job ladder) and now have become too large for production in a downturn. We test for the former by measuring whether revenues are dierentially cyclical across high-and low-paying rms and do not nd evidence of such an eect, though our test is imperfect since we can only obtain revenue data for publicly traded rms. We also nd no evidence that highpaying rms suer more from downward earnings rigidities (and therefore would have to layo workers in tough times rather than cutting pay).
We view this body of results as being most consistent with a job ladder model where workers tend to use jobs at low-paying rms as stepping stones to better opportunities elsewhere. In an economic downturn those opportunities do not present themselves and workers are forced to stay put. Firms higher up on the job ladder will naturally experience this impact of a downturn less, because workers are more likely to see those jobs as nal destinations, regardless of economic conditions. In particular, the Moscarini and PostelVinay (2013) poaching model predicts this set of ndings. In their model, rms at the top of the job ladder poach workers away from rms at lower rungs, enabling them to grow in a boom. In a bust, they stop poaching because they do not need to produce at the same scale (and may indeed need to trim the fat o their existing workforce), enabling rms at 7 Hyatt et al. (2014) nd a high correlation between separations to non-employment in the LEHD data and layos in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), and an even higher correlation (just under 1) between separations to employment in the LEHD and quits in the JOLTS.
lower rungs to retain their workers. This results in more cyclically sensitive employment at high-paying rms, while low-paying rms fare relatively better in a bust.
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Our results are very much in the spirit of Barlevy (2002) who shows that the decline in job-to-job transitions seen in recessions has a quantitatively important negative eect on match quality, terming this the sullying eect of recessions. 9 We nd that workers at low-paying rms suer more from this decline in voluntary mobility, implying a further sullying eect of recessions: workers get stuck in worse overall quality (lower paying) jobs.
Our estimates imply that in a large recession, average earnings decline by 0.1% ($4/month) due solely to the shifting composition of workers across rms. We also estimate that workers in the lowest paying rms are 20% less likely to upgrade to a better rm in a large recession, compared to a boom. Kahn, and Speer 2014). Second, the consequences of job displacement have been shown to be much larger when displacement occurs in a recession (Davis and von Wachter 2011). It therefore seems that being forced to search and match during an economic downturn can be incredibly damaging to a worker's career. We conclude the paper with some evidence on this dimension. We show that workers matching in a large recession are both more likely to match to a low-paying rm, and, one year later, less likely to have upgraded to a better rm. Therefore, a year after matching, a worker is in a rm that pays 2.6% less, on average, when matching in a bust compared to a boom.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, while section 3 details our methodology. Section 4 presents our core regression results on net and gross worker ows. Section 5 provides a discussion of the results, and tests for the underlying mechanisms. Section 6 shows how rm upgrading and the careers of new matchers are impacted by the mechanisms uncovered in the previous sections. Section 7 concludes.
Data
We analyze employment changes within rms and over the business cycle using data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program. The 8 In a recent paper, Haltiwanger, Hyatt and McEntarfer (2014) use the LEHD to measure the cyclicality of poaching across large and small rms. Counterintuitively, they do not nd evidence that large rms poach from small rms, on net. However, motivated by our ndings in this paper, they provide additional results categorizing rms by pay (as we do), rather than by size. Here they do nd strongly pro-cyclical net employment reallocation of workers from low-to high-paying rms, consistent with our results. 9 See also Bowlus (1993) and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) for empirical evidence on the decline in match quality in recessions. These data are advantageous in that they allow us to observe both gross and net worker ows for a substantial fraction of rms in the U.S. labor market. Furthermore, we can create a rich set of rm characteristics to measure employer quality. Finally, the time period over which we can exploit a balanced panel consisting of a large number of states allows us to capture both the 2001 and 2007-09 recessions. We take advantage of prototype data on job-to-job ows developed from the LEHD by Hyatt and McEntarfer (2012b).
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Our exercise in this paper is to analyze how rms of dierent qualities are impacted by the business cycle. Our measure of quality is based on average pay in the rm. Since one goal of this paper is to better understand the experiences of workers in recessions, we would ultimately like our quality measure to correlate with properties of a desirable job. Obviously pay is an important dimension of worker satisfaction. Furthermore, rms that can pay higher wages are likely more productive. Seranelli (2012) , for example, presents evidence using detailed administrative data in Italy that high paying rms are indeed more productive.
We construct time-invariant pay measures by taking average wage within an establishment over our entire sample period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . This avoids the well-known reclassication bias 10 These data link primary jobs across quarters, using the timing of hires and separations to infer which worker moves are job-to-job moves (with little-to-no time in non-employment) versus moves to and from longer spells of unemployment. The sample is restricted to primary jobs only, to clean out noise in the job-to-job ows data. However, our results on net employment growth and gross hires and separations are fully robust to including all jobs. These data are also used in Hyatt and McEntarfer (2012a) , who document aggregate patterns in worker ows over the last 15 years and compare changes in earnings for dierent types of moves, and Haltiwanger, Hyatt, and McEntarfer (2014) , who measure the extent of poaching behavior by large rms away from small rms.
problem (for example, that a rm is reclassied into a higher pay bin as the economy grows; see Moscarini Postel-Vinay (2012)), though our results are robust to other measures. 11 Figure 1 shows an employment-weighted kernel density of rm-level average monthly earnings (for employees who work an entire quarter, in 2008 dollars). This distribution has a long right tail and to avoid potential data disclosure issues, we cap earnings at $12,000.
As can be seen, we have substantial variation across rms over this time period. In our subsequent analysis we divide rms into employment-weighted quintiles, based on this measure.
We use state-industry-specic cut points (measured at the two-digit NAICS level). Our categories thus dene rms as high-or low-paying relative to other rms in the same state and industry. Workers in the lowest paying quintile earn on average $1,842/month, while workers in the highest paying quintile earn on average $6,665/month (see table 2 We subsequently analyze the impact of the unemployment rate on growth rates as a function of rm quality, measured by the pay quintiles. We have a number of reasons for making these pay quintiles state-industry specic. First, our denitions are not sensitive to dierent costs-of-living across states. Second, rms may have dierent average labor bills for reasons unrelated to the quality of the job. For example, a greater reliance on part-time workers would lower the overall labor bill (we cannot measure hours); a greater reliance on sub-contractors for particular roles would shift the pay distribution within a rm (we cannot measure occupation); a dierent mix of base pay, benets, bonuses, tips, could also alter the level and distribution of pay within a rm. Making our cutpoints industry-specic should at least help hold constant these factors. However, we cannot distinguish whether our measure identies high-paying rms, or rms that tend to employ highly-paid workers.
We therefore interpret our results as being applicable to either margin. Finally, we identify the impact of the business cycle using local labor market conditions, as measured by the state unemployment rate. This measure is likely less relevant for traded sectors and will vary across states with dierent natural rates of unemployment. The fact that our cutpoints our comparisons across rms are within state and industry helps here as well.
The key dependent variables in this paper are net employment growth rates as well as gross ow rates. To calculate these rates, we aggregate our rm-level data to the state-yearquarter-industry-wage quintile category, by summing employment and worker ows in each cell.
12 This level of aggregation allows us to control for industry, while still enabling us to capture employment dynamics driven from rm births and deaths.
13 11 In particular, we have experimented with using a two-quarter moving average as in Fort et al. (2013) . Our results are also robust to categorizing based on average pay at the establishment, rather than rm (the LEHD imputes workers in a close geographic region to the same establishment within an SEIN). 12 We aggregate to the three-digit NAICS industry level here so that we can both control for two-digit industry xed eects, and experiment with other controls at a more disaggregated level. 13 While in principle, we could conduct our analysis at the individual rm level, that would produce growth, hire and separations rates that are quite a bit noisier. These rates are misleadingly large in the period in which a rm starts or closes and outliers can be generated by seasonal employers or non-reporting events (or Specically, the quarterly growth rate in a given quarter, t, for a rm pay type, q, is dened in equation 1, where B is beginning of quarter employment, E, is end of quarter employment, in a rm, f . The growth rate is the net employment change among all rms, f , of type q (rms are indexed 1 to F q ) divided by average employment over the quarter, t, among these rms.
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(1)
Hire and separation rates are dened in equations 2 and 3, respectively, as the total number of hires (A) or separations (S) in quarter, t, at rms of quality, q, divided by average employment over the quarter. Our results are robust to an alternative denominator, total employment over the quarter, which is sometimes used in the literature. However, our denitions are convenient because the common denominator across the three rates means that the hire rate minus the separation rate must add up to the growth rate (see Lazear and Spletzer 2012).
We further decompose both separations and hires into those directly to/from employment and those to/from non-employment. A separation is categorized as a move directly to another employer if the worker has pay from another employer in the same quarter as the separation or the quarter immediately following. Because our data only come at a quarterly frequency, a worker must have at least a full quarter without earnings to be categorized as a mover to non-employment. See Hyatt and McEntarfer (2012b) for more detail. Information on gross in principle mergers and acquisitions, though the LEHD use an algorithm to exclude these events). At the individual rm level, these outliers create problems for our estimation, so we prefer the slightly aggregated analysis presented here. This aggregation is particularly important given an LEHD data limitation: that it is dicult to link rms consistently over time due to periodically changing SEIN's.
14 Note this formula implies that the growth rate is well dened for rm births and rm deaths (or, more precisely, cells made up entirely of rm births or cells made up entirely of rm deaths) and equals 2 or -2, respectively.
hires and separations, as well as decompositions across source or destination of the worker are not available in most data sets, even those containing measures of net employment growth, and herein lies much of our contribution. Table 1 presents employment-weighted summary statistics by rm category for our rates of interest. Again, the unit of observation is a date-industry-state-pay quintile cell. Growth rates are fairly similar across pay quintiles, ranging from 0.0014 to 0.003.
15 Hire and separation rates are highly correlated within rm category, reecting the fact that most hiring serves to replace workers who have separated, but rates vary widely across rm category.
For example, gross hire and separation rates in the lowest pay quintile are, on average, over double the rates in the highest pay quintile. Across our whole sample period and for all types of rms, separation rates are roughly evenly split between separations to employment and non-employment. Hires are also roughly evenly split across those from employment and those from non-employment, except that at lower paying rms workers are relatively more likely to be hired from non-employment, while the opposite is true at higher paying rms.
Jobs at higher paying rms could be more dicult to obtain, consistent with a job ladder, so such rms tend to hire from a higher quality pool of workers, the employed. 
We place rms into quintiles based on the average excess churn rate over the entire sample period, and report this distribution for each pay quintile. From column 1 of table 1, about a third of rms in the lowest pay quintile are in the highest churn quintile, while only a tenth are in the lowest churn quartile. These ratios are almost exactly reversed in column 5, the highest pay quintile. This illustrates the strong negative correlation between pay and churn.
In some specications we will control for the churn distribution within pay quintiles. Table 1 also shows the rm size distribution in each pay quintile. Firm size is dened as the number of employees in the SEIN on the 12th day of the rst month of the quarter, 15 Based on our categorization, high-paying rms have double the growth rate of the other quintiles. One might have expected lower paying rms to grow more quickly because of positive correlations between pay, size, and age. Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2013) show that small rms grow faster than large rms, but this is driven by the fact that small rms are also younger.) By generating quintile cutpoints that are state-industry-specic, we make rms across categories much more similar to each other. For example, while a third of low paying rms (based on our categorization) are small, another third are very large. Overall the lowest paying rms (unconditional on state and industry) are much more likely to be small and are also the fastest growing.
averaged over the life of the SEIN. 16 Larger rms have been shown to have higher pay, better working conditions, a greater degree of benets provision, increased productivity, and increased probability of rm survival (Brown and Medo 1989, Hurst and Pugsley 2011).
In our data, the lowest paying rms are predominantly found in either the smallest (less than 20) or largest (500+) size categories. The majority of higher paying rms are in rms with at least 500 employees. Again, in some specications, we will control for the rm size distribution underlying the pay quintile. 3 Methodology
In order to understand the dierential impact of the unemployment rate on growth, hire, and separation rates across rm pay quintiles, we estimate regressions of the form specied in equation 5.
We regress rate sItq , a growth, separation, or hire rate among rms of quality, q, in state, s, in industry (three-digit NAICS), I, in time period, t, on the state unemployment rate (st_unemp st ), a vector of rm quality indicators (W q ) corresponding to pay quintiles, and their interactions. We weight by average employment over the quarter. The coecient, α 1 , yields the impact of a 1 percentage point (ppt) increase in the state unemployment rate on rate sItq for the omitted rm quality category, the lowest pay bucket. The vector of interaction terms, α 3 , indicates whether the impact of st_unemp is dierent for higher pay buckets. The main eects of rm quality (W q ) and the industry xed eects (I industry , at the two-digit NAICS level) control for level dierences in rate sItq across dierent types of rms or industries (for example, some industries may on average be shrinking and others growing).
It is important for st_unemp to isolate random shocks to a local labor market, rather than general dierences across locations or broad time periods, because we are interested in understand how rms are impacted by business cycle shocks. We therefore additionally control for state xed eects, and include exible controls for time period, f (t), in two forms. First we control for quarter xed eects and a linear time trend. These allow us to control for seasonality and secular changes over this time period (for example, the marked decline in churn during the 2000s), while still exploiting time-series variation in economic conditions at both the national and state levels. However, since we only have a short time period we would like to ensure that our results are not driven by spurious correlations due to anomalies that coincided with business cycle movements. Therefore, in an alternative specication, we control for date xed eects, absorbing all variation in the national time series and identifying purely o of cross-sectional variation in economic conditions.
Our key identifying assumption is that st_unemp and its interactions with W q are exogenous in equation 5. A problem for us would be if a sItq-cell were so large that the growth rate of rms in that cell had a mechanical link to the state unemployment rate. However, we do not nd such reverse causality plausible, given that our level of observation is fairly disaggregated, at the three-digit NAICS level. Another problem would be if labor market shocks were mis-measured by the state unemployment rate, and especially if this was differential across rm type. For example, for rms producing non-traded goods, the local unemployment rate is likely highly correlated with whether the rm experiences a shock, while for rms producing traded goods, the local unemployment rate may be less indicative.
First, we point out that in some specications we exploit both local and national variation in economic conditions, and these will be most relevant for rms producing traded goods.
Second, this kind of measurement error in economic conditions will bias α 3 downward in magnitude, especially for pay buckets with a higher share of rms producing traded goods.
It is well known in the trade literature that exporting rms are higher paying.
Thus this
should be a larger problem for higher pay buckets, biasing us against our nding that growth rates at higher paying rms are more sensitive to the business cycle.
We experiment for controls for the average distribution of size and churn within a pay bucket. Given both variables are highly correlated with rm pay, it is useful to know whether either pay or churn are the underlying drivers of the dynamics reported in the paper, or whether these dynamics exist within size and churn. We can understand this to the extent that there is variation within pay bucket in these variables.
Finally, we cluster our standard errors by state. Our key explanatory variable, the statespecic unemployment rate, varies at the state-level and over time, but is likely serially correlated within state. We have also clustered at the state-date-rm quality level and obtained very similar results in terms of statistical signicance.
17 See Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007) for a survey. They cite a wealth of evidence documenting that exporters tend to be larger, more productive, more skill-and capital-intensive, and higher paying, relative to non-exporters. 4 Regression Results on Growth, Hire, and Separation To gain a general sense of the time series relationships among economic conditions and growth across rm quality, we rst look at the dierential growth rate across our lowest and highest quintiles. We simply subtract the rate in the highest pay bucket from that in the lowest. Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) do a similar exercise comparing growth rates at large and small rms. This dierential growth rate is plotted in gure 2 along with the national unemployment rate (dashed line). Both lines have been detrended using a HodrickPrescott lter, and seasonally adjusted by residualizing on quarter dummies (therefore the levels are not that meaningful).
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Though noisy, the dierential growth rate very closely tracks the national unemployment rate. That is, when unemployment is high, low-paying rms grow relative to high-paying rms, while when unemployment is low, low-paying rms shrink relative to high-paying rms.
Note these eects are symmetric across booms and busts.
The time series evidence presented in gure 2 is suggestive, however with such a short panel of data, we cannot perform any sort of reliable statistical inference based solely on this time series. We now turn to a regression framework where we exploit cross-sectional variation in unemployment rates across our 34 states and 56 quarters. Results are reported in table 2. The dependent variable is the growth rate (net change in employment divided by average employment over the quarter) in the state-date-industry-wage quintile. We focus rst on panel A, which reports the point estimates and standard errors from equation 5.
The specications in columns I and II control for time period with quarter xed eects and a time trend, while columns III and IV instead control for date xed eects. Columns II and IV augment the preceding specication with controls for churn and size distributions.
Results are extremely similar across all four specications. We tend to focus on column IV, since the date xed eects absorb any coincidental trends that are correlated with the unemployment rate, and the churn and size controls to some extent allow us to isolate rm pay as the primary mechanism.
From column IV, the main eect of the unemployment rate, shown in the top row, is negative, though very small in magnitude (0.00019) and not statistically signicant. This coecient can be interpreted as the impact of the unemployment rate on the growth rate for the lowest pay quintile the omitted category in each regression. This regression suggests, then, that the employment growth rate at low paying rms is acyclical. The interaction terms show the dierential impact of the state unemployment rate on the growth rate at 18 We rst lter the dierential growth rate and the unemployment rate, using a smoothing parameter of 1600, then regress the ltered series on quarter dummies and obtain residuals.
higher paying establishments. They are all negative and statistically signicant at the 1% level. This means the state unemployment rate has a more negative impact on the growth rate at higher paying establishments. For example, a coecient of −0.0011 (with a standard error of 0.00009) among the highest paying rms, indicates that for each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, these rms shrink by 0.0011 more than the tiny eect seen in the lowest paying establishments. Multiplying this coecient by 6 yields the predicted impact of the Great Recession on the growth rate.
19 This eect is quite large considering the mean growth rate for this group was roughly 0.003. Coecients are fairly similar for the 3rd through 5th wage quintiles, while smaller in magnitude for the 2nd quintile but still highly signicant.
Because rm types dier in their baseline growth rates (for example, the growth rate in the highest paying rms is nearly double that in the lowest paying rms), we convert our estimates to elasticities. This also helps interpret the magnitudes of these eects. Panel B reports the total impact of a 1% increase in the state unemployment rate on the growth rate at each rm-quality bucket (adding an interaction term to the main eect of the unemployment rate for higher paying rms).
20 From the rst column, in response to a 1% increase in the state unemployment rate, the growth rate among the lowest paying rms does not change while the growth rate for the highest paying rms declines by 2.2%. Elasticities are substantially larger in magnitude for the 2nd-4th pay quintiles, declining by 2.9%, 4.0%, and 4.4%, respectively. These are again quite similar across specication.
Thus from table 2, we conclude that growth rates at the lowest paying rms are acyclical.
In contrast, growth rates at higher paying rms are counter-cyclical, though in terms of elasticities, the highest paying rms are also a bit sheltered. These results have implications for the distribution of jobs over the business cycle, since low-paying rms grow relative to high-paying rms in busts. To put a magnitude on that, we can take average monthly earnings in each type of rm, reported in table 1, and predict average pay in the economy based on the implied distribution of workers across rms. Starting from a point when workers are evenly distributed across the quintiles, the average worker is in a rm paying $3815/month. Our estimates imply that after the Great Recession, the average worker is in a rm paying $4/month less, or almost 0.1% less. During the Great Recession, real gross domestic income fell by 3.8%. Compared to this benchmark, the impact on the distribution of workers across rms is modest, but not unsubstantial. 19 The national unemployment rate rose from 4.2 in 2006:Q4 to a peak of 10.4 in 2010:Q1. 20 To obtain these elasticities we add α 1 to the relevant interaction term in α 3 (or nothing in the case of the lowest quintile), multiply and divide by the quintile-specic averages for the state unemployment rate and the growth rate (respectively) reported in table 1.
Hire and Separation Rates
The regressions in table 2 show that growth rates at higher paying rms are more negatively impacted by the unemployment rate. By denition, the growth rate equals the gross hire rate minus the gross separation rate. We can thus decompose the impact of the unemployment rate on the growth rate into eects on these two margins. First, to get a general sense of how these uctuate dierentially across rms over the business cycle, we plot the dierential rates in gure 3. The left panel shows the dierential gross separation rate (the separation rate in the lowest paying rms minus that in the highest paying rms), while the right panel shows the dierential gross hire rate. These gross ow rates look roughly pro-cyclical, exhibiting very dierent patterns than the dierential net growth rate from gure 1. When the unemployment rate is low, low-quality rms hire and separate at greater rates than highquality rms, while the opposite is true in times of high unemployment. These eects are largely symmetric across booms and busts, though more so for the dierential separation rate than for the hire rate. Table 3 presents regression results for separation rates (left panel) and hire rates (right) for four specications (the same as those presented above). Both dependent variables show quite similar patterns to each other, though like the gures, opposite patterns to the growth rate. From panel A, the main eect of the unemployment rate is negative and a similar magnitude for both hires and separations, while the interaction eects are positive and signicant.
That is, the negative impact of the unemployment rate on both hires and separations at the lowest paying rms is somewhat oset at higher paying rms. 21 The magnitude of the oset increases with pay quintile, as might be expected, though the contrasts are stronger for separation rates than for hire rates. Our estimates from column IV imply that in the Great Recession, separation rates would have declined by 1.7 ppts at the lowest paying rms and by 0.25 ppts at the highest paying rms, while hire rates would have declined by 1.6 and 0.8 ppts, respectively.
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Panel B reports elasticities, analogous to table 2. Converting to elasticities is particularly important here because the average separation and hire rates at the lowest paying rms is double that at the highest paying rms (from table 1), making the units dicult to compare.
For example, it would be much easier for a rm to reduce its separation rate by a third of a ppt o a base of 20% than o a base of 10%. For separation rates, these elasticities generally 21 That separation rates decline in times of higher unemployment might be surprising given we expect rms to make more layos in a worse economy. However, this nding is consistent with a more-than-osetting decline in voluntary quits (e.g., Shimer 2005 , Hall 2005b ). 22 Results are again quite similar across specication. The biggest dierence across specications is that the main eect of the unemployment rate on both hires and separations declines in magnitude (by about a third to a fth) when we control for date xed eects. The date xed eects absorb any variation in national economic conditions, leaving only local deviations to the national economy to identify the unemployment rate eect. Thus some of the overall eect from columns I and II is due to sensitivity to national economic conditions, which probably makes sense, while the magnitudes of the interaction eects remain fairly constant across specication.
hold up to the patterns presented in panel A; elasticities at lower paying rms are larger than those at higher paying rms. Elasticities for hire rates, show dierent patterns across specications; in columns I and II elasticities are actually smaller in magnitude at lower paying rms, while in columns III and IV elasticities are similar in magnitude across all rms.
Discussion
The growth rate equals the hire rate minus the separation rate. Table 2 showed that growth rates were less impacted by the business cycle at low paying rms. Table 3 indicates that this eect is driven by the separations margin. The lowest paying rms have a dramatic decline in worker exits in a downturn, which allows them to maintain their workforce in spite of a large reduction in hiring. Higher paying rms do not see such a decline in separations but they still have relatively large declines in hiring (in percent changes they see a fairly similar decline to lower paying rms). 23 The growth rate eect is close to zero for the lowest quintile, and exhibits a shallow decline (increase in magnitude) across higher quintiles, before leveling o at the highest quintiles. In contrast, the separation and hire rate impacts are large in magnitude and negative for the lowest wage quintile and steadily increase (decrease in magnitude) across higher quintiles. The separation rate eect is very close to zero for the highest paying rms. Thus, while net employment changes are more cyclical at high-paying rms, gross worker ows are more cyclical at low-paying rms.
The gap between the hire and separation and rate eects (which will add up to the growth rate eect) is largest among the highest paying rms. In busts, hires and separations decrease by roughly the same amount at the lowest paying rms, so net employment remains roughly constant, while at higher paying rms separations do not decline by as much as hires do, so they shrink. In boom times, low-paying rms have relatively more separations, with a commensurate increase in hires, resulting again in a constant size, while high-paying rms increase their hires by more than their separation rate increases by, resulting in faster growth.
Distinguishing among theories
We have shown that employment growth rates at low-paying rms are less sensitive to the business cycle than those at high-paying rms. This is inconsistent with Schumpeterian cleansing, which predicts that resources would be reallocated from low-to high-paying rms in recessions, since the former are likely less productive. In the introduction, we emphasized that other factors could drive worker ows in the opposite direction. For example, a temporary collapse in the job ladder in a downturn would generate a relative reduction in moves from low-to high-paying rms (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay 2013). Also, if high-paying rms are more sensitive to the business cycle because demand for their products is more cyclically sensitive (perhaps because they sell luxury, or otherwise more expensive, goods), we should see relative declines in employment for these rms (Bils and Klenow 1998) . In this section, we try to distinguish between these, and other stories that could be generating our results.
Types of Mobility
The employment advantage aorded to low-paying rms in downturns is driven by a large reduction in worker separations, and exists despite an equally large decline in hiring at these 
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The separations to non-employment results show that while the lowest paying rms have negligible impacts, the higher paying rms have larger, positive eects. Interaction terms are typically signicant at the 5% level, and elasticities tend to produce the same patterns. 24 In columns III and IV, elasticities are larger in magnitude for lower paying rms than for higher paying rms, while in columns I and II, elasticities are fairly similar in magnitude across rm type. We tend to prefer the former since those specications have date xed eects. So the bulk of evidence in table 4a is that declines in the types of moves that are more likely to be voluntary are much larger at lower paying rms.
Thus the gross separations margin is driven by a large decline in separations-to-employment among the lowest paying rms, and a modest increase in separations to non-employment among the higher paying rms. This can be seen in gure 4, which decomposes the separation rate eect into separations to employment (long-dash green) and non-employment (short-dash green). Again we plot the total impact of a 1 ppt increase in the state unemployment rate on these separations rates for each pay quintile. Clearly from the gure, the level impact of the separation rate eect is driven primarily by the impact on separations to employment. The impact of the unemployment rate on these is large and negative for the lowest paying rms, but becomes smaller in magnitude for higher paying rms. Also, higher paying rms see a small positive impact on separations to non-employment.
The inference that a separation to employment was more likely a voluntary move on the part of a worker, while a separation to a full quarter of non-employment was more likely a layo, is imperfect in that this mapping likely varies across rms and over the business cycle. For example, there is some evidence that monthly job nding rates are lower for skilled workers, likely because they have higher returns to search. Thus a skilled worker might be more likely to be observed without pay for a full quarter following a layo. Workers laid o from a low-paying rm may not show up as a separation to non-employment if they nd another bad job quickly. Thus the separations-to-employment rate might include more layos at low-paying rms, especially in downturns. However, we nd an overall large decline in separations-to-employment in the lowest paying rms. Any such misclassication of layos, which would imply an increase in separations-to-employment in a downturn (when rms lay o more workers) is clearly not large enough to oset this decline.
There are a few reasons why we might see relative increases in separations-to-nonemployment among the higher paying rms. First, these rms may be in more distress because of either more cyclical sensitivity in the product market or because of frictions inhibiting them from adjusting on other margins (such as wage or price rigidities). Both are explored in the next subsection. An increase in layos at rms at the top of the job ladder is also in spirit consistent with the Moscarini Postel-Vinay (2013) poaching model. These rms grow large in a boom because they have a large queue of potential workers to choose from. They may grow too large in scale for a downturn and need to shed workers. Further conrmation of the poaching model might be obtained by looking at hires. If good rms poach away from bad rms in boom times, and a reduction in this poaching behavior is what allows bad rms to retain their workforce in busts, then we should see large declines in hires from employment for the high-paying rms. Table 4b shows impacts on hire rates decomposed into those that came from employment (left panel) and non-employment (right). In magnitude, hires from employment decline by most at the lowest paying rms (the rst and second quintiles). Impacts are about 20-40% smaller in magnitude for the highest paying rms. Once converting to elasticities, however, we see the eects are roughly similar across groups.
Impacts on hires from non-employment are pretty small, and even slightly positive for the highest-paying rms, though the latter are only marginally signicant. Figure 4 decomposes the hire rate into these two components, showing the total impact of a 1 ppt increase in the state unemployment rate on hires from employment (long-dash red) and non-employment (short-dash red). This decomposition mirrors that for separation rates. The level impact of the hire rate eect is driven primarily by the impact on hires to employment, where the eects of the unemployment rate are most negative for the lowest paying rms.
Thus high-paying rms do exhibit reductions in hires from employment (poaching) in a recession, consistent with Moscarini Postel-Vinay (2013). However, even though magnitudes are similar in terms of percent changes, the lower paying rms experience relatively larger reductions in levels. Why do low paying rms also have such a large reduction in hires? A natural interpretation is that after a large decline in voluntary worker exits, low-paying rms respond with a commensurate decline in hires, targeting roughly the same size workforce.
It is plausible, then, that a reduction in poaching in a downturn drives the impact on the hires-from-employment rate at high paying rms, while a response to a reduction in attrition drives that at lower paying rms.
Labor Demand Explanations
High-paying rms might have a greater need to cut on their labor bill because of a greater product demand cyclicality. Or, for a given need to cut the labor bill, high-paying rms might suer more from rigidities. Either could explain why higher paying rms seem to respond to a downturn by laying o workers, more so than lower paying rms. We explore these explanations empirically in this subsection.
Cyclicality of product demand
Firms may dier in how a recession impacts their protability because of dierential product demand cyclicality. For example, consider an inexpensive chain restaurant and a ve-star restaurant. The latter most likely pays their employees more and also might have more cyclical demand. Indeed, Bils and Klenow (1998) showed that luxury products indeed have more cyclical demand. If there is a positive correlation between worker pay and prices then we might expect higher paying rms to be more sensitive to business cycle uctuations.
To investigate dierential product demand cyclicality, we need information on rm performance other than employment changes. The LEHD has a measure of revenue at the rm level but it is unreliable. Instead, we turn to Compustat North America by Standard & Poors, the most complete database of U.S. accounting data.
Compustat has reliable
balance sheet data for publicly-traded rms. We can therefore ask whether fundamental 25 We obtain these data via Wharton Research Data Services.
accounting data are more sensitive to the business cycle at high-quality rms, among those that are publicly traded.
The disadvantage of Compustat data is that it is made up of publicly traded rms, all of whom may be considered reasonably high-quality. The low-paying rms in Compustat may be a poor representation of low-paying rms in the LEHD and the economy as a whole.
We therefore rst present evidence on whether the patterns presented above that exist in the LEHD also exist in Compustat rms. Though Compustat does not have comparable earnings or gross worker ows data, it does have annual employment. We can therefore perform our net growth rate analysis using rm size as a proxy for rm pay.
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We dene size based on average employment in the rm over its lifetime in Compustat (analogous to our pay measures). We then divide rms by size quintile, where the cut points are within industry.
27 Figure 5 presents the dierential net growth rate (blue line) of the lowest minus highest size quintile, by year, analogous to those presented in gure 2. The national unemployment rate is also shown (red dashed line). As can be seen the lines track each other very closely; when the unemployment rate increases, small rms grow relative to large rms, and vice versa when the unemployment rate decreases. Figure 5 is useful since it shows that even among rms within Compustat, all of whom must be reasonably high quality, the same basic dynamics hold. We hope, then, that analyzing the balance sheet data in Compustat can tell us something about the nancial pressures high-and low-paying rms face over the business cycle.
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We use the rate of change of quarterly revenue as a proxy for a rm's incentive to hire.
Prot maximizing rms will set employment such that marginal cost equals marginal revenue product. Presumably rms with more cyclical product demand will experience accompanying revenue declines. We link the Compustat revenue change data to the LEHD by aggregating quarterly revenue change to the three-digit NAICS level. This allows us to ask whether LEHD pay quintiles are made up of rms in sub-sectors which typically experience more or less business cycle volatility, as measured by Compustat.
29 Figure 6 plots these percent revenue changes for rms in the lowest quintile (dashed red line), rms in the highest quintile (dash-dot green line), and the average for rms in the 2nd through 4th quintiles (solid blue line). We also include recession bars. Reassuringly, revenue change has a strongly cyclical pattern, falling in recessions and rising in booms. However, the graph shows little dierence across low-and high-paying rms over the business cycle. Low-paying rms experienced 26 Size is a common proxy for pay since the two variables are highly correlated. Moscarini Postel-Vinay (2012) show in a large number of countries that small rms grow relative to large rms in slack labor markets, while the opposite is true in tight labor markets. 27 Since most rms in Compustat have a larger, national presence, we do not use geographic location information. 28 Though not shown here, in regression analysis, the relationship between net employment changes and the national unemployment rate is statistically signicantly larger in magnitude (more negative) at rms in the largest size quintile compared to the smallest. 29 We are not permitted to link Compustat data to the LEHD at the rm level because of condentiality concerns.
a slightly larger decline in revenue change during the 2001 recession, while high-paying rms experienced a slightly larger decline in the Great Recession.
30 This gure is therefore inconsistent with the notion that high-paying rms are more sensitive to the business cycle.
Based on the evidence presented here, we think it unlikely that dierential business cycle sensitivity in the product market is driving our results. The sub-sectors where low-and high-paying rms are typically found do not experience dierential sensitivities, as reported by Compustat. Though we should caution that this exercise needs to be taken with a grain of salt, since it is based on an unrepresentative set of rms. We investigate downward earnings rigidities in the LEHD using total quarterly earnings for a worker from a given rm. This measure has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, we cannot measure whether there exist nominal reductions in pay rates, the variable most discussed in the literature. However, our measure incorporates a number of dimensions along which a rm can adjust labor costs besides lowering the base rate of pay, for example hours, overtime and bonuses. This is certainly the more relevant measure for our purposes, since we are trying to explain whether some rms have a greater need to cut labor costs by ring workers rather than by lowering pay.
Downward earnings rigidities
To test whether the strength of downward pay rigidities vary with rm quality, we follow 30 A plot of dierential revenue change across low-and high-quality rms, analogous to our gure 2, shows no systematic relationship with the unemployment rate. We prefer to present the gure in levels instead since it generates more intuition for the measure itself. 31 The queuing literature also suggests that high-paying rms will have more rigid pay, relative to lowpaying rms. High-quality rms post a high wage, which results in a long queue of workers who wish to work there, driven for example by an eciency wage (Akerlof and Yellen 1985) , imperfect information (Weiss 1980) or explicit personnel policies (Okun 1973) . They would then nd it easier to adjust the size of their workforce without adjusting wages. A corroborating piece of evidence comes from the cyclical upgrading literature which nds that wages are more cyclical in low-paying industries (Bils and McLaughlin 2001) . This would nicely explain why high-quality rms need not increase wages in expansions, however, is it less compelling for explaining why a rm would not lower wages in a contraction. a similar methodology to Dickens et al. (2007) . We measure nominal annual pay changes in earnings, ∆p it , for job stayers.
32 For a rm, f , in time period t, we then estimate the nominal pay rigidity as per equation 6. That is, for a rm with N workers who have a valid pay change measure, we take the number whose annual pay change was equal to 0 and divide that by the number whose pay change was less than or equal to 0. In practice, we dene a pay change to be equal to 0 if it is within ±1%, to allow for some noise, and results are robust to larger bounds. (6) nominal pay rigidity
This measure proxies for the following: Among workers who were at risk of receiving a nominal pay decrease, what share did NOT receive one? We nd that on average over our time period, this share is roughly 0.25. We then average these within our rm-pay buckets, weighting by average employment at a given date, to gain a sense of whether rms of varying quality experience dierential pay rigidities over the business cycle. 33 However, the graph very clearly shows that high-paying rms have a much larger drop in rigidities in recessions. Also, the middle-quintile rms seem to be a bit more cyclical themselves with earnings rigidities increasing during the boom years between the two recessions.
This measure of downward nominal pay rigidities is far from perfect. For example, we can only estimate the rigidity among stayers at a rm, while we have already shown that high-and low-paying rms dier in their gross separation rates over the business cycle. For example, a high-paying rm might layo its workers whose pay cannot be adjusted, leaving only those whose pay can be adjusted. However, the evidence presented here suggests that high-paying rms are able to adjust labor costs in recessions, relative to low-paying rms, by cutting earnings. Therefore, we do not believe dierential earnings rigidities can be driving our results.
34 32 A worker must have 10 continuous quarters of earnings to be included in the sample. At the quarterly level, issues arise such as dierences in the number of pay cycles within a quarter that vary across rm and across calendar year. To avoid additional noisiness, we measure annual pay changes. We also trim the distribution of earnings changes to those who had more than ±50% changes, since these presumably represent errors in reporting. 33 The data show rigidity for pay changes that occur over the next year. Thus the cyclical pattern looks as though it leads the recession bars. 34 Analyzing dierential rigidities (analogous to our gure 1), similarly reveals that high-paying rms become dierentially less rigid in times of high unemployment. We again prefer to present the gure in levels to help build intuition for our metric itself. Given positive correlations between pay, productivity, and size, it could be that low-paying rms are always closer to the margin of survival and therefore always focused on eciency.
This would result in a relatively greater need for high-paying rms to lay o workers in downturns. However, such a theory suggests the counter-intuitive notion that low-paying rms manage more eciently. This seems on the surface unlikely, given that low-paying rms are on average smaller, have higher churn, and are probably less productive.
In contrast, one might suppose that given their lower productivity, smaller size, and likely lower probability of survival, low-paying rms manage ineciently. While, high-paying rms layo workers in economic downturns, low-paying rms do less of this, even though they should. This seems unlikely for a couple of reasons. First, such poor management should result in relatively more rm deaths in bad times at low-paying rms. Our employment measures include rm deaths yet we still nd that on average, low-paying rms grow relative to high-paying rms in busts, including and despite any shrinkage from rm deaths. Second, reinspecting gure 4, and noting the larger adjustment in gross ows at low-quality rms, it does seem as though managers at low-paying rms respond. Faced with a large decline in voluntary quits, low-paying rms respond with a commensurate decline in hiring. This suggests that low-paying rms do respond to their business environment and target a particular sized workforce.
It could be that because low-paying rms are on average smaller, they cannot lay o workers without stopping production. That is, there might be a divisibility problem where a large rm could shut down a fraction of its production by laying o that fraction of workers, while a small rm does not have that many whole bodies to work with. To address this, we have performed our analysis restricting the sample to rms with at least 50 workers, and obtained very similar results.
35 These are available upon request.
Finally, we point out that a simple compensating dierentials framework can yield our results. In equilibrium, volatile jobs need to be higher paying in order to make the marginal worker indierent between working there and a low-paying job with stable employment.
However, this is also on the surface at odds with some evidence in the data. From table 1, the lowest paying rms have 20% turnover each period, while the highest paying rms have half that. They also have larger rates of separation-to-non-employment, a more negative risk. Thus the lower paying jobs are on average much more unstable. 6 Impacts on the job ladder
We nd that employment growth at high-paying rms is pro-cyclical, while growth at the lowest paying rms is acyclical. The latter is accompanied by a sharp decline in worker churn in recessions. We have shown that the most likely driver of these results is that the job ladder to some extent breaks down in a bust, allowing low-paying rms to retain their workforce. In this section we quantify the size of this breakdown in the job ladder, based on data on individual workers and their transitions across rms. We also estimate impacts for new job matches in light of the fact that job seekers seem to be particularly scarred by recessions.
All Workers
To asses both the level of worker mobility up the job ladder in normal times, and how this changes over the business cycle, we estimate ordered logit models of the form specied in
] is the pay quintile of an individual's primary employer in t + 1.
We allow this to be a function of the state unemployment rate in t, dummies for pay quintile of the rm in t (W it ), interactions between the two, and a set of controls which mirror those from our main specication in equation 5.
Regression results are reported in appendix table 1. Coecients are quite similar across four specications; we control for either quarter xed eects and a time trend or date xed eects, and sometimes include controls for worker characteristics (age, gender and job duration in t). Across all specications, we nd that a higher unemployment rate in t reduces the likelihood of being at a higher pay quintile in t + 1, and this eect is signicant at the 1% level. This represents the eect for the omitted category, workers in the lowest quintile in t. The interaction terms show that for workers in higher quintiles in t the unemployment rate eect is almost completely oset.
A more natural interpretation is presented in table 5, where we report implied transition matrices from this regression for a boom (4.2% unemployment rate) and a bust (10.4% unemployment rate), in the left and right panels, respectively. We use regression coecients from column IV, which includes date xed eects and worker characteristics.
Focusing rst on a boom and for workers who were in the lowest quintile in t (left panel, rst column), we estimate that nearly 89.9% of these workers remain in the lowest paying rms one quarter later (this could be their rm in t or a dierent rm in the same pay quintile). This means that 10.1% move up the job ladder, with the vast majority moving up only one rung. One way to quantify the magnitude of this chance of upgrading is to assign average pay to each quintile (from table 1 ) and predict what kind of rm the average worker will be in one quarter later in terms of average pay at that rm. This is shown in the bottom row. Those beginning in the lowest quintile in t will on average be at a rm whose average pay is $1,936 in t + 1. This represents 5% advancement above their starting point which was $1,842 (average pay at the lowest quintile).
Workers starting at higher rungs of the ladder could upgrade, downgrade or stay put. For example at the second rung workers stay in their current rung 72% of the time, and upgrade or downgrade with roughly equally probabilities, around 14%. Workers in the highest run in t are most likely to survive in their current rung, at 94%.
The right panel reports what our estimates imply for these transition probabilities in a bust. The largest impacts are on workers in the lowest paying rms. Only 8% of these workers upgrade rms over the quarter, one-fth fewer than in a boom. In t + 1 these workers have only upgraded to a rm paying $1,917/month, $19 less (or a 20% smaller expected advancement) than in a boom. Transitions for incumbents in rungs 2-4 are essentially unaffected by the bust, while workers in the top rung in t are a bit less likely to hold onto their position until t + 1.
These results are quite consistent with what we found above. They imply a substantial breakdown of the job ladder for workers in the lowest rung, as well as a small loss of position for workers in the highest rung, and not much change for those in the middle. However, it is worth pointing out that these results are selected since they restrict to those working in t + 1. Though not shown, we estimate that on average, those in lower rungs in t are less likely to be working in t + 1, a higher unemployment rate in t also implies a smaller chance of working in t + 1, but that those in higher rungs in t face a greater negative impact of the unemployment rate. They are dierentially less likely to be working in t + 1, consistent with our nding earlier that higher paying rms are more likely to make layos in a downturn.
Thus table 5 cannot fully quantify the regressive eects of a recession on a worker's position when starting at higher rungs, since these workers are substantially more likely to be out of work for at least a full quarter.
6.2 New Entrants
The relative advantage low-paying rms retain in a downturn might help to explain why the two groups mentioned in the introduction, recent college graduates and those displaced from a job where they had high tenure, face substantial earnings losses when these events occur 36 Our estimates imply that in the Great Recession workers in the top rungs of the ladder had a 2 ppt increased probability of transitioning to non-employment in the next quarter, while workers in the bottom rung were unaected. 25 in a downturn. 37 Our estimates imply that the distribution of jobs shifts towards the lower paying rms in a downturn and that these jobs become stickier. How much of the long-term earnings losses for each of the groups mentioned above can be accounted for by this shift in the distribution of jobs and a short-term break down of the job ladder?
To answer this question, we estimate two ordered logit regressions, shown in equations 8 and 9.
(8)
Equation 8 estimates the likelihood of matching to a higher paying quintile as a function of economic conditions at the time of the match and controls. Appendix table 2 reports logit coecients for four specications analogous to those that have been reported throughout the paper. We estimate a signicant reduction in the likelihood of matching to a better rm when the unemployment rate is higher, across all specications. Table 6 reports tted probabilities implied by the specication in column IV (which controls for date xed eects and worker age and gender) for both a boom and a bust. In a boom (rst column), 42.2% of new matches are to the lowest paying rms. These rms are overrepresented in job starts compared to the stock of workers (which is by construction evenly distributed across rm type). This is because of the especially high churn rates at the lowest paying rms. In contrast only 4.6% of new matches are to the highest paying quintile. The bottom row shows that the average worker matching to a rm in a boom is at a rm paying $2,782, on average. This is lower than the $3,811 average for the stock of workers.
In a bust (second column), the rm quality distribution shifts downward. Workers are about 4 ppts more likely to match to the lowest paying rms and about a point less likely to match to each of the higher quintiles. This amounts to a nearly $90 reduction in rm quality (average rm pay for the average matching worker) or 3% less than those matching in booms. Of course this exercise is merely descriptive in the sense that we have not adjusted for ability dierences across those matching in booms versus busts. There could be negative selection of workers matching to rms in recessions, since those with a good current position stay put (see Kahn (2013) for evidence on this). However, it is also at least consistent with 37 Davis and von Wachter (2011) estimate that the impact of job displacement for those with at least 3 years of tenure is a 20% drop in the present discounted value of lifetime earnings, for those displaced in a recession. The impact for those displaced in a boom is a 12% drop. Altonji, Kahn, and Speer (2014) estimate that those graduating from college into a large recession in the U.S. experience an average drop in annual earnings of roughly 2% per year over the rst decade of a career, and similar impacts on wage rates. Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz (2012) nd similar losses in Canada and show they manifest through initial matches to worse (smaller) rms. This ordered logit predicts the location of a worker (in terms of rm pay quintile) 3 quarters later, for workers matching to a rm in t, as a function of the economy in t, the type of rm matched to, and the interaction, as well as some controls. Regression coecients for four specications are reported in appendix table 3. We nd that the unemployment rate at time of match is negatively related to rm quintile 3 quarters later, for workers matching to the lowest quintile (the omitted category). This eect is fully oset for workers matching to the 2nd and 3rd quintiles, and halfway oset for those matching to the 4th quintile. The eect is exacerbated for those matching to the highest quintile in t, and in total is 5 times larger than the base eect.
We again report transition matrices for the nal specication (which includes date xed eects, a quadratic in age, and a gender dummy) in table 7. Workers who match to the lowest ranked rms in a boom (left panel, rst column) do tend to upgrade in the rst year following the match. Only 62.5% of these workers remain in a low paying rm, while a quarter have upgraded to the 2nd pay quintile and more than 10% have actually moved up to an even higher quintile. On average, a worker matching to the lowest paying rms in a boom is at a rm whose average pay is $2,346 three quarters later. This is a $500 advancement above the average pay at the lowest paying rms ($1,842) or 27%. Workers starting out in higher rungs are also slightly more likely to hold their position or advance, than to backslide. For example, 27% of workers matching to the 3rd quintile remain at that quintile, while another 27% advance to the 4th or 5th quintiles. Among those matching to the highest paying rms, 65% retain their position 3 quarters later, when matching in a boom. However, a quarter slide back to the 4th quintile and 10% slide back further than that.
For those matching in a bust, these gures look fairly similar, with some important dierences. Above, we estimated that in busts there is a substantial decline in exits-toemployment from the lowest paying rms. This eect means that workers matching to the lowest paying rms in a bust will probably be less likely to upgrade, initially. Indeed, the right panel of table 7 shows that 63.8% of those matching to the lowest paying rms in a bust retain their position; thus only 36.2% advance, 1.4 ppts less than for those matching in a boom. In dollar terms, the average worker moves to a rm whose average pay is $2,325 when matching in a bust, or $20 less advancement (4.2%) than those matching in a boom.
Above, we also estimated that the highest paying rms are more likely to make layos (i.e., separations to non-employment) in a bust. From table 7, it looks as though these layos hit new entrants especially hard. Workers matching to a top paying rm in a bust are far less likely to maintain their position, 57.5%, compared to 65% in a boom. In dollar terms, this amounts to a $214 lower average rm pay in t + 3. It is thus much worse to match to a high-paying rm in a bust than a boom. Perhaps these rms look to clean out some of their incumbent workforce in a bust, but still need some temporary, lower skilled workers, to squeak by with their production needs.
Workers matching to rms in the middle of the pay distribution do not see much of a change in mobility when matching in a bust compared to a boom.
Overall, how do workers fare when matching to a rm in a bust compared to a boom? If we assume the matching probability does not change over the business cycle (that is, ignore the results from equation 8), and instead t the boom match probabilities, we get that the average worker is at a rm paying $2,946 3 quarters later, if matching to a boom, and only $2,929 if matching in a bust. These are both advancements relative to the initial match, which we reported above as $2,782 in a boom. This nearly $20 dierence or 10% smaller advancement for those matching in a bust is attributed solely to the reduced probability of upgrading after matching. If we also factor in that workers are more likely to match to low paying rms in a recession, we get the combined eect. The average worker, 3 quarters later, is at a rm paying on average $2,871. Thus the full eect of matching in a bust, compared to a boom, is a $75 lower average rm quality 3 quarters later. This is 2.6% of the average earnings in t + 3 for someone matching in t in a boom, or half of their typical advancement.
The same disclaimer on causality applies here. However, we nd these results interesting, consistent with the reduction in voluntary mobility estimated above, and useful for considering the possible magnitudes the dynamics presented above can have in terms of impacts on workers and the job ladder.
Conclusion
In this paper, we use employer-employee matched U.S. data to study net and gross worker ows over the business cycle as a function of rm pay. We nd that low-paying rms fare relatively better in downturns; their growth rates are unaected by the business cycle. The evidence suggests that in normal times, low-paying rms suer from a large worker separation rate, and therefore also do a lot of replacement hiring. In bad times, separations decline substantially at these rms and they aim for a commensurate reduction in hires. This keeps the growth rate relatively constant over the business cycle. The decline in separations exhibited in a recession look to be a decline in voluntary separations on the part of the worker since the largest eect is for separations to employment. Higher paying rms experience less of an impact on their separations to employment but still a large reduction in hires. The highest paying rms also increase separations to non-employment, which most likely represent layos. As we have said, these ndings are consistent with the Moscarini Postel-Vinay (2013) poaching model, though we cannot completely rule out a small role for dierential sensitivity to the business cycle driven by consumer demand.
While previous research has emphasized that match quality may decline in recessions due to a lack of workforce reallocation (Barlevy termed this the sullying eect of recessions in his 2002 paper), our evidence here suggests an additional sullying eect. The types of jobs workers get stuck in are more likely to be low quality. Our results suggest that the reduced ability to move on to better matches caused by a recession has a greater impact on workers in low-quality rms compared to those in high-quality rms. We estimate that a large recession reduces the probability of advancing out of the lowest paying rms by 20%.
These each have particularly long-lasting, negative earnings impacts. Both groups were forced to search for, and likely accept, a job in a downturn. Our results indicate that workers matching in recessions are more likely to go to a low-paying rm, and more likely to stay there once matched. These eects combine to an estimated 2.6% drop in average rm quality a year after matching, for those matching in a recession compared to a boom, or $75/month lower average rm pay. These workers thus lose out on roughly half of the advancement made by workers matching in a boom. Our estimates are based solely on typical pay in these rms, and do not reect any heterogeneity within rm. Also, they do not pick up any scarring eects from spending time at a low-paying rm. These could include both how a worker is perceived to potential employers, but also impacts on human capital accumulation and the development of networks. These impacts could be large and long-lasting. Quarter fixed effects + time trend X X Churn and size controls X X Date fixed effects X X Notes: Regressions weighted by average employment over the quarter. All regressions control for quintile fixed effects, as well as state and two-digit NAICS industry fixed effects. Quintiles are obtained by averaging quarterly pay over the lifetime of the firm and fitting into the two-digit NAICS industry-state distribution weighted by employment. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level. Coefficients from panel A are converted to elasticities in panel B by adding th emain effect of U to the relevant interaction term then multiplying and dividing by the quintile-specific average state unemployment rate and growth rate, respectively, from table 1.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
State Unemp Rate (U) State Unemp Rate in t (U) + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Notes: Sample is all new matches in t. We report estimates from ordered logits. Regressions also include state and industry fixed effects. When included, worker characteristics are a quadratic in age and a gender dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
